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1  Introduction
The Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 (“UIA”)1 and Unemployment 
Insurance Contributions Act 4 of 2002 (“UICA”)2 are applicable to all employers 
and employees except for those specifically excluded. Unless specifically 
excluded, participation in the unemployment insurance scheme is compulsory.3 
The UIA scope of coverage is narrow as it continues to exclude the atypically 
employed (particularly independent contractors, so-called dependent contractors 
and those who are self-employed or informally employed), public servants in the 
national and provincial spheres of government, learners, and certain categories 
of migrant workers from its purview.4 Given the vulnerable position of these 
groups, it is arguable that South Africa should, as a matter of principle, broaden 
the scope of coverage to include them. Furthermore, these exclusions may be 
susceptible to constitutional challenge in the context of the right to access to 
social security.
* This is the first in a series of three articles which addresses areas of potentially required reform of 
the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) in order to ensure an improved unemployment insurance 
mechanism, and to affect meaningful alignment with the other available social security interventions  
The second contribution (forthcoming in the Stellenbosch Law Review 2011 (1)) will address the concept 
of ‘activation’ in the context of UIF reform, while the final contribution in the series will examine selected 
issues impacting upon the current legal framework (including contractual interfacing, dispute resolution 
and adjudication) (forthcoming in the Stellenbosch Law Review 2011 (2))  This contribution is based on 
work done by the authors for the Unemployment Insurance Fund of South Africa in relation to the reform 
of the South African unemployment insurance system  The authors wish to acknowledge the research 
assistance provided by Adriaan Wolvaardt, doctoral candidate and researcher of the International 
Institute for Social Law and Policy (IISLP)
1 The Act provides for unemployment, sickness, adoption, maternity and survivor benefits in respect of 
workers and their dependants  
2 Employers and employees contribute equally to the Unemployment Insurance Fund (“UIF”)
3 Van Kerken & Olivier “Unemployment Insurance” in Olivier, Smit & Kalula (eds) Social Security: A 
Legal Analysis (2003) 415 435  
4 Van Kerken & Olivier “Unemployment Insurance” in Social Security: A Legal Analysis 436-437
       
While the UIA has extended its scope of coverage over time, much more 
could be done to reduce exclusion and marginalisation in the unemployment 
insurance system. The UIA, unlike its predecessor, widened its scope of 
coverage to include domestic workers, seasonal workers and so-called high-
income earners. The inclusion5 of domestic workers6 and seasonal workers,7 
despite the scepticism expressed prior to their inclusion, appears to be 
progressing satisfactorily.8 Apart from extending the right to unemployment 
benefits to domestic workers generally, the 2003 amendments to the UIA9 
provided for specific modalities of benefit extension, namely to a domestic 
worker whose contract of employment is terminated by the death of his or 
her employer,10 and also to domestic workers who are employed by more than 
one employer.11 This is an expression of the rationale that the provision of 
benefits in the case of partial unemployment provides the affected person with 
an opportunity to remain in the labour market. Following the inclusion, in 
principle, of seasonal workers in the UIA in 2001, it was found not necessary 
to provide specific modalities for their inclusion (as was the case with domestic 
workers). This means that seasonal workers are covered by the UIA on the same 
basis as other employees. As regards high-income earners, this category of 
employees was excluded from the scope of coverage of the previous UIA since 
it was regarded as a group which was unlikely to suffer from unemployment 
and its effects. The current UIA removes that exclusion, thereby ensuring 
that more persons have financial protection when they become unemployed 
and, importantly, strengthening the financial base of the UIF.12 Finally, it is 
important to note that the Minister of Labour has been granted the power to 
5 S 3(2) of the UIA, when it entered into force, provided that the Act “will only apply to domestic and 
seasonal workers and their employers 12 months after this Act takes effect”  Arrangements were made 
for these two categories to be included, with the effect that since the adoption of the Unemployment 
Insurance Amendment Act 32 of 2003 domestic and seasonal workers are now covered by the UIA
6 A “domestic worker”, as defined by s 1 of the UIA and s 1 of the UICA, is:
   “an employee who performs domestic work in the home of his or her employer, and includes a gardener, 
person employed by a household as a driver of a motor vehicle, and person who takes care of any person 
in that home, but does not include farm worker”
7 Prior to the Unemployment Insurance Amendment Act, s 1 of the UIA and s 1 of the UICA defined a 
“seasonal worker” to mean:
   “any person who is employed by an employer for an aggregate period of at least three months over a 12 
months period with the same employer and whose work is interrupted by reason of a seasonal variation 
in the availability of work”
 This definition has been deleted by s 1 of the Unemployment Insurance Amendment Act  The rationale 
behind this deletion is, as the Memorandum on the Object of the Unemployment Insurance Amendment 
Bill 35 of 2003 states, “to treat seasonal workers the same as other employees”  See para 1 2(a) of RSA 
Unemployment Insurance Amendment Bill B35 of 2003 in GG 25234 of 2003-07-22
8 For example, the Department of Labour reported in 2006 (three years after the inclusion of domestic 
workers under the ambit of the UIA) that 657 000 domestic employers had been captured on the UIF 
database and that more than 500 000 domestic workers had been registered  Minister Mdladlana viewed 
this as “a clear vindication of the Department’s resolve to extend coverage to the most vulnerable sector”  
See Department of Labour “Even More Domestic Workers Benefit from UIF” (2006-08-10) Press Release 
para 9 http://www labour gov za/media-desk/media-statements/2006/even-more-domestic-workers-
benefit-from-uif (accessed 12-11-2010)
9 Unemployment Insurance Amendment Act
10 S 16(1)(a)(iv) of the UIA  
11 S 12(1A) of the UIA
12 Van Kerken & Olivier “Unemployment Insurance” in Social Security: A Legal Analysis 435
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deem any category of persons, by notice in the Government Gazette, to be 
contributors for purposes of the whole or any part of the UIA.13
Despite the abovementioned inclusions, the South African unemployment 
insurance laws still exclude certain groups and categories of persons 
from their unemployment protection coverage. Widening the net of the 
current system to include the excluded categories will be the focus of this 
paper. Before considering the broadening of the social insurance system in 
more detail, part 2 of the article will contain a short overview of varying 
unemployment insurance funds and systems from countries around the world. 
It focuses mainly on countries in the OECD, but also discusses some aspects 
of unemployment insurance in South America, Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, and briefly reflects on the possible inclusion of the informal sector and 
self-employed. It concentrates on a variety of aspects concerning the design of 
the systems discussed, including whether they cover members of the informal 
sector and those that are self-employed, how they are integrated with other 
parts of the social security system, whether they include social assistance, and 
whether the payments are dependent on searching for employment or training.
Part 3 of the article will contain a detailed discussion of certain currently 
excluded categories. It considers principled arguments for the inclusion of 
these categories and raises specifically the question whether the continued 
exclusion of some of these categories can be legally justified. Part 4 contains 
concluding remarks and some recommendations.
2  Comparative perspectives: a brief excursus
2 1  OECD countries
There are some general trends in the development and implementation of 
unemployment insurance in different regions of the world. These regions can 
generally be grouped together by the economic status of those regions, ie 
whether the countries are classed as developed, developing or considered to 
be transition economies.
Most unemployment insurance schemes in OECD countries cover all 
employed people, whilst commonly omitting the self-employed. The latter 
are excluded either through the design of the schemes or by occupation 
groups or are based on other conditions. Some countries, such as Ireland, 
Japan, Portugal, Spain, and the United States, omit casual workers and 
domestic workers. While the duration of benefits differs across countries 
and is normally between three to twelve months, there are some European 
countries which have benefits of long duration, such as 60 months in France, 
48 months in Denmark, 36 months in Norway, 32 months in Germany and 
benefits of unlimited duration in Belgium. Most countries expect individuals 
who receive unemployment insurance payments to report to employment 
offices regularly, to be willing to work and to be actively searching for 
13 S 83(1)(b) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (“BCEA”), inserted by s 20 of the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Amendment Act 11 of 2002 (“BCEAA”)
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employment.14 Recipients can also often be disqualified from payments if 
they are unwilling to undergo training, if they unjustifiably refuse an offer of 
employment, or fail to fulfil the expectations of searching for employment. 
Periods of disqualification typically range from one to four months.
As a rule, individuals are not forced to take a job which does not fit their 
criteria early in their phase of receiving unemployment payments. However, 
the longer an individual receives unemployment insurance, the more pressure 
on that individual to take other reasonable job offers. Most programmes in 
OECD countries are financed by both the employees and employers, with 
more funding coming from employers and the state covering any deficit. 
Unemployment insurance is funded solely by the employer in the USA, 
Iceland and Italy. Contribution rates are normally about 3%, but some are as 
high as 8%.15
2 2  Latin America and the Caribbean16
2 2 1  Introduction
Latin American countries tend to have underdeveloped unemployment 
insurance schemes which typically only cover wage workers in the private 
sector. In Argentina, unemployment insurance only covers salaried workers in 
the private sector and excludes those in the public sector, domestic workers and 
the self-employed. In 2000 coverage was only 10%. Brazil’s unemployment 
insurance only covers workers who are dismissed involuntarily. Members 
receiving unemployment payments have them terminated immediately if they 
reject a job offer. In 2001, 11.8% of workers were covered by unemployment 
insurance. Uruguay’s unemployment insurance only covers private sector 
workers. Members that are receiving payments can receive training to equip 
them for further employment. In 2001, 14.7% of Uruguayan workers were 
covered. In Venezuela, unemployment insurance covers salaried workers and 
employees from the public and private sectors who are faced with involuntary 
unemployment. They must belong to the social insurance scheme in order 
to be eligible for payments. In 1999, 7.2% of the working population in 
Venezuela was covered. In Barbados, unemployment insurance is for salaried 
workers, and those receiving payments must participate in training courses. 
Entitlement periods in these countries vary between three to twelve months 
with contribution rates varying between 0.75 to 2% with both employers and 
employees contributing.17
14 See the second article in this series, entitled “Activation in the Context of the Unemployment Insurance 
System in South Africa” (forthcoming)
15 Vodopivec “Introducing Unemployment Insurance to Developing Countries” 2009 Policy Paper No. 6 
Institute for the Study of Labor 34
16 The following paragraph draws its data primarily from a study by Miranda-Munoz Globalization and 
Protection against Unemployment Risk in the Americas (2007) unpublished paper presented at 5th 
International Research Conference on Social Security Warsaw hosted by the Social Insurance Institution 
of Poland, 05-03-2007 www issa int/fre/content/download/39476/774621/file/2miranda pdf 27-30 
(accessed 12-11-2010)  
17 Vodopivec 2009 Policy Paper No. 6 Institute for the Study of Labour 36  The paragraph drew its data 
primarily from a study by Miranda-Munoz Globalization and Protection against Unemployment 27-30
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2 2 2  Chile: innovative approaches
In 2002, Chile approved the Unemployment Insurance Law which made 
unemployment insurance compulsory for workers whose employment contract 
started after the enactment date, which was October 2002, and voluntary for 
employees whose contracts had started before then.18 The system has two 
innovative features. The first is the use of individual savings accounts. This 
involves a fixed amount of the worker’s salary, about 0.6%, and a contribution 
from the employer, about 2.4%, being paid into a savings account in the 
worker’s name. The money in this account can be withdrawn according to 
a predetermined schedule: between 30% and 50% of the previous wage. 
The second feature of unemployment insurance in Chile is a common fund 
(Solidarity Severance Fund (SSF)) which is sourced from direct contributions 
from the state and payments made by the employer, amounting to 0.8% of 
earnings. The government’s annual contribution is fixed at about US$14.5 
million (2009). The purpose of the common fund is to share the risk, as well 
as ensuring that newer members of the unemployment insurance scheme 
and members who are in low-paying employment or unstable employment 
can receive payments to the pre-determined amount should they become 
unemployed. Members must have been making payments into their individual 
savings accounts for more than twelve months in order to benefit from the 
common fund, and the normal length of payout is five months. Employees 
who were previously employed full-time receive 50% on their first payment, 
which then diminishes by 5% each month until only 30% is received in the last 
month. Temporary employees are also covered by unemployment insurance. 
Employers pay 2.8% of the temporary employees’ wage directly into their 
private savings account and 0.2% into the SSF. Payments can then be accessed 
for two months, but at a lower rate than is the case with open contract 
employees. The payments have recently been adjusted to take into account 
the extended length of time that it may take to get a job in times of high 
unemployment. This has been done by creating a system whereby “for every 
month the national unemployment rate is one percentage point higher than the 
national four-year average, all beneficiaries who are due to receive their final 
monthly unemployment payment will be eligible to receive two additional 
months of benefit at a replacement rate equal to 25 per cent of their previous 
earnings”.19 Any payments that are not claimed by employees are made 
available for them when they retire, contributing to their pension payments. 
This helps to serve as a disincentive to claim unemployment benefits.
The unemployment insurance fund is managed by a private firm, which has 
six main tasks: “to collect contributions, credit individual savings accounts, 
invest the resources in the financial market, verify eligibility criteria, pay 
benefits, and pursue debtors”.20 Managing the fund has three important 
18 Acevedo, Eskenazi & Pagés “Unemployment Insurance in Chile: A New Model of Income Support for 
Unemployed Workers” (2006) World Bank SP Discussion Paper 0612 2
19 ISSA Unemployment insurance in Chile: Reform and Innovation, ISSA Feature (2009) http://www issa int/
News-Events/News2/Unemployment-insurance-in-Chile-Reform-and-innovation (accessed 12-11-2010)  
20 Acevedo et al World Bank SP Discussion Paper 0612 18
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aspects. The first is that the fund which could offer the lowest administrative 
fees for the first ten years was successful in gaining the tender. The second 
is that both the common fund and the saving accounts are separate from the 
managing fund’s assets, protecting the Unemployment Insurance funds from 
economic problems. Thirdly, the fund is separated from the state, ensuring 
that the state cannot hijack the fund for its own political or economic gain.21
The unemployment insurance scheme covers all private sector employees 
above the age of eighteen – both full-time and temporary – receiving a salary, 
excluding members of the informal sector, public servants and the self-
employed. In December 2008, 60% of the working population was covered by 
the Unemployment Insurance scheme, with the abovementioned categories of 
workers excluded.22
A positive point that can be taken from the Chilean experience for developing 
countries and the implementation of unemployment insurance is that the 
single savings account reduces the disincentive of seeking employment while 
receiving unemployment insurance payments. This is because the payments 
only last for a maximum of five months and these payments diminish the longer 
unemployment lasts. Another incentive for not claiming the unemployment 
payments is that if they remain unclaimed by the time that the individual 
retires, they are added to the individual’s pension payments.
It is difficult to measure the success of the Chilean unemployment 
insurance system. What became clear initially was that a large number of 
workers in Chile (about 44% of contributors to the insurance scheme) were 
employed on fixed-term contracts or temporary contracts. Within this group 
of people, there are high levels of unemployment or employment uncertainty. 
The unemployment insurance is not successful at covering such individuals as 
their payments are limited to two months and are not particularly high. This is 
at least an improvement on the original scheme which did not give fixed-term 
contract workers access to the SSF and only gave a once off payment.
It was found that people with well-paid and stable jobs in the formal 
sector are successfully and effectively covered by the new scheme as they 
can accumulate enough money in their individual savings accounts and are 
less likely to face regular unemployment. Workers with low income and 
precarious jobs, particularly those in the informal sector as well as those with 
temporary contracts, would barely be covered at all by the insurance scheme. 
This essentially means that the most vulnerable workers remain vulnerable 
during unemployment.23
2 3  Eastern Europe and Central Asia
In the transition economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the majority 
of programmes cover employed workers, with domestic, self-employed and 
casual workers normally excluded. The duration of payments vary from 6 to 
21 18-19
22 ISSA Unemployment Insurance in Chile.
23 Sehnbruch “Privatised Unemployment Insurance: Can Chile’s New Unemployment Insurance Scheme 
Serve as a Model for Other Developing Countries?” (2004) CLAS Working Paper 12 27  
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24 months, with the duration sometimes reliant on length of employment or 
contribution periods. The responsibilities on those receiving payments are very 
similar to those in OECD countries. Most countries expect individuals who 
receive unemployment insurance payments to report to employment offices 
regularly, to be willing to work and to be actively searching for employment. 
Recipients can also often be disqualified from payments if they are unwilling 
to undergo training, if they unjustifiably refuse an offer of employment, or 
fail to fulfil their expectations of searching for employment. The funding of 
the scheme is typically from the employer, with some countries also having 
employee contributions. Contribution rates are lower than OECD countries, 
with employee contributions between 0.06% (Slovakia) and 1% (Slovak 
Republic) and employer contributions varying between 0.06% (Slovenia) and 
6% (Albania). As is the case in all OECD countries, the government makes up 
for any deficits.24
2 4  Informal Sector
Workers in the informal sector, especially those in the developing world, 
are in a precarious position regarding income. In many cases they live from 
hand to mouth and do not have a constant stream of income. This makes it 
difficult for many of them to save money or plan for the future, leaving them 
particularly vulnerable to unemployment. The sector also has some inherent 
complexities when it comes to attempting to create appropriate unemployment 
insurance schemes. These include the following:
• Many schemes rely on dual payments from both the employer and employee, 
meaning that often only workers in the formal and private sector, or those 
with a traditional employment contract, can be successfully covered. 
Workers in the informal sector do not have such a contract and it is also 
difficult to ascertain whether they have an employer.
• Furthermore, the low level of income and inconsistent revenue streams 
received by many members of the informal sector make it difficult to 
encourage them to make monthly payments into an unemployment 
insurance scheme, and periods of unemployment may be quite common.
• Further difficulties which are faced when attempting to extend coverage 
of unemployment insurance to informal sectors include the difficulty of 
monitoring members of the informal sector who could receive payments. 
The informal sector has low barriers to entry and exit, making it expensive 
to monitor and administer unemployment insurance to members of the 
sector.
Unemployment insurance funds invariably do not cover members of the 
informal sector, and this is especially the case for developing countries that 
have large informal sectors.25 With this being the case, it is suggested that there 
are some changes which can be brought about to traditional unemployment 
24 Vodopivec (2009) Policy Paper No. 6 Institute for the Study of Labour 35
25 Vodopivec (2009) Policy Paper No. 6 Institute for the Study of Labour 4
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insurance schemes which could be considered to extend unemployment 
insurance coverage to the informal sector.
Countries with large informal economies may adopt different approaches 
to unemployment insurance. These include:26
• While many unemployment schemes cease payments to individuals once 
they have accepted a new job, it is suggested that this would prove to be a 
major disincentive to members of the informal sector to seek employment 
or accept employment in that sector. It is therefore suggested that members 
of the informal sector should be allowed to take employment in the informal 
sector, without having to give up unemployment insurance payments.
• Another change which is suggested is that members of the informal sector 
and those in developing countries should rely on worker and employer 
contributions for financing of the unemployment sector, as is the case in 
the Chilean example. This would eliminate the disincentives to seeking 
employment as well as providing a degree of self-monitoring.
• The final suggestion, and which again can be seen in the Chilean example, 
is to lower the payment rates over time, and also to make sure the level of 
payment is lower than the wage that people can receive when employed.
These changes will ensure that payments from unemployment insurance 
are unlikely to be manipulated. Whilst these suggestions appear relevant 
to the extension of unemployment insurance to the informal sector, and to 
developing countries specifically, as can be seen from the Chilean example, 
it remains to be seen whether such changes actually provide suitable cover to 
members of the informal sector or to people in the developing world who do 
not have stable, formal sector employment.
2 5  Self-employed workers
Few unemployment insurance schemes cover the professionally self-
employed. This is especially the case with unemployment insurance in 
developing countries, but also the position in the majority of developed 
countries, although there are some examples of schemes in OECD countries 
which cover the self-employed, with coverage for the self-employed being 
voluntary and being open to restrictions.
Two such countries are Sweden and Denmark. In both countries, 
unemployment insurance is voluntary and the funds are administered by 
organisations similar to trade unions.27 Denmark, for example, has two 
separate, voluntary funds specifically for self-employed workers, while 
Sweden also has a fund specifically aimed at the self-employed. In Sweden, 
the qualifying conditions are the same for the self-employed as for regular 
employees. These conditions include being employed for a minimum of six 
months during the course of the last twelve months. A self-employed person 
26 See generally 12-17
27 Clasen & Viebrock “Voluntary Unemployment Insurance and Trade Union Membership: Investigating 
the Connections in Denmark and Sweden” 2008 Jnl Soc Pol 433 433-434
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in Sweden is considered unemployed if their business activity comes to an 
end, not only in the case of a temporary break.28 In Denmark,
“membership contributions to an unemployment insurance fund consist of a variable contribution 
toward financing the fund (rates vary according to fund), a mandatory fixed contribution toward 
payment of unemployment insurance, and a voluntary fixed contribution toward payment of early 
retirement pay. A self-employed person pays 8% of gross salary or earnings toward the Labor Market 
Fund to cover state expenditure on unemployment insurance benefits and voluntary early retirement 
pay”.29
Since the beginning of 2009, self-employed workers in Austria have been 
allowed to opt into unemployment insurance. The self-employed must opt 
in before the end of 2009 if they have been self-employed before 2009, or 
within six months of becoming self-employed. These restraints are placed 
on registration in order to ensure that individuals do not join unemployment 
insurance fund when their business begins to struggle. The self-employed can 
choose their own contributions:
“[They can] now choose to have their 6% contribution calculated on 25%, 50% or 75% of the social 
security payroll tax cap, which corresponds to monthly unemployment payments of €555, €870 or 
€1,200”.30
It is too early to see if this system will be effective at covering the self-
employed or whether it will be attractive to entrepreneurs.
3  South Africa: persons or categories of persons currently 
excluded from unemployment insurance
3 1  Employees who resign or suspend their employment
Employees who resign may not claim benefits under the Act.31 While this 
was introduced to stop abuse, a consequence is that employees who leave 
employment for reasons such as further education or training, or to establish 
their own businesses, cannot claim benefits. Employees who become self-
employed effectively forfeit past contributions. The impact of this on job 
mobility and the pursuit of training activities needs to be considered.
In a recent study, Paul Benjamin identifies a number of trends in 
regulatory regimes aimed at protecting workers who are either unprotected or 
inadequately protected by labour (and social security) rights.32 Of particular 
relevance is the development of “transitional labour markets” to provide 
28 United States Social Security Administration (SSA) Social Security Programs Throughout the World: 
Europe, 2008 - Sweden (2009) http://www socialsecurity gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2008-2009/
europe/sweden html (accessed 10-10-2010)
29 SSA Social Security Programs Throughout the World: Europe, 2008 – Denmark (2009) http://www
socialsecurity gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2008-2009/europe/denmark html (accessed 10-10-2010)
30 Widner “Self-employed Eligible for Unemployment Benefits” (2009) http://www internationallawoffice
com/newsletters/detail aspx?g=81b55049-b800-4c46-b462-74a44a729403 (accessed 12-11-2010)
31 See s 16(1) of the UIA
32 Benjamin Informal Work and Labour Rights in South Africa (2008) paper presented at a conference on The 
Regulatory Environment and its Impact on the Nature and Level of Economic Growth and Development 
in South Africa hosted by the Development Policy Research Unit at the University of Cape Town, 
27-10-2008 http://www commerce uct ac za/Research_Units/DPRU/Conference2008/Conference2008_
Papers/Paul_Benjamin_INFORMAL%20WORK%20AND%20LABOUR%20RIGHTS%20IN%20
SOUTH%20AFRICA pdf 11 (accessed 12-11-2010)
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greater security to workers during transition phases in their working life. This 
approach identifies the major life course transitions such as those between 
education and employment, (unpaid) caring and employment, unemployment 
and employment, retirement and employment, and precarious and permanent 
employment. An institutional reform associated with this approach is the 
notion that unemployment insurance should be transformed to employment 
insurance to provide income security during transitions between education, 
training and employment.33 Active labour market policies that promote the 
re-training and reintegration of unemployed workers back into the workforce 
provide “protected mobility” which enhances the security of individuals 
when they are not in work. Benjamin refers to studies which indicate that the 
provision of social insurance during initial periods of self-employment can 
promote entrepreneurship.34 This approach is helpful in providing guidance 
on which group of contributors should be excluded from the general principle 
that those who voluntarily leave their employment may not claim benefits 
under the Act. It is suggested that exceptions should specifically be allowed 
for the following three categories of employees:
(i) Employees who leave their employment to undergo further education or 
training. This would create a crucial link between unemployment benefits 
scheme and the promotion of skills development and training in terms of 
the Skills Development Act 97 of 1998. In this way, further training and 
education could be viewed as part of the “activation” measures described 
in more detail in part 2 of this article.
(ii) Employees who resign in order to become self-employed. It has already 
been indicated that there is a strong link between the provision of social 
insurance during initial periods of self-employment and entrepreneurship.
(iii) Employees who resign or suspend their employment for any compelling 
family reason. One of the major life course transitions identified above is 
that between (unpaid) caring and employment. It is therefore suggested 
to extend unemployment benefits to employees who resign to take care of 
children or to care of a terminally ill family member (a so-called “carer’s 
benefit”). Unlike maternity benefits, however, the contributor’s benefits 
are not restored after making use of this benefit.
Making provision for these three exceptions would necessitate the 
introduction of a set of new definitions into the UIA:
• “Compelling family reasons” could be defined to include both the care of 
children (natural or adopted) and that of a terminally ill family member.
• “Family member” could be defined to include a list of family members, 
including a common-law partner. The compassionate care benefit in 
33 Benjamin Informal Work and Labour Rights 12
34 Hessels, Van Stel, Brouwer & Wennekers “Social Security Arrangements and Early-Stage Entrepreneurial 
Activity” 2007 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 743 771-772, as cited in Benjamin Informal Work and Labour 
Rights 12  
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Canada35 is even extended to someone caring for a gravely ill person who 
considers the claimant to be akin to a family member (for instance a close 
friend or neighbour).36
• “Common-law partner” could be defined as a person who has been living 
in a conjugal relationship with that person for at least a year.
In order to prevent abuse, it will be necessary for the person claiming a 
“carer’s benefit” to provide proof showing that care is taken of children and 
that the ill family member needs care or support and is at risk of dying within 
a short period of time.37 Similar verification measures would also have to be 
developed for the extension of unemployment insurance to those resigning to 
undergo education or training to become self-employed.
Furthermore, it is envisaged that the “carer’s benefit” for “compelling 
family reasons” (that would provide benefits in the case of caring for one’s 
own children plus adopted children) would eventually be removed from the 
UIA and provided for in a separate scheme that would also include maternity 
benefits and adoption benefits. In addition, if the proposed Health Insurance 
Fund were to make provision for sickness benefits, it would mean that the 
sickness benefit could eventually also be removed from the UIA. This would 
mean that the Fund could in the medium- to long-term become a Fund that 
caters purely for the contingency of unemployment, which would result in 
a financially strong fund that will provide better benefits and eventually 
possibly even extended benefits. This reason makes the inclusion of a “carer’s 
benefit” even more compelling.
3 2  Persons who do not fall within the definition of “employee”
3 2 1  Introduction
The UIA defines an employee as “any person who receives remuneration 
or to whom remuneration accrues in respect of services rendered or to be 
rendered by that person, but excludes any independent contractor.”38 This 
definition, which apart from focusing solely on the formal sector employment 
relationship, is narrower than that contained in labour laws39 and excludes 
35 Compassionate care benefits are payable to a maximum of six weeks to claimants who provide care to a 
gravely ill or dying family member and fall under the Employment Insurance Scheme
36 It is not suggested that the UIA go this far
37 In Canada the period is 26 weeks  
38 S 1 of the UIA
39 The definition of “employee” contained in s 1 of the BCEA and s 213 of the Labour Relations Act 66 
of 1995 (the “LRA”), for example, covers “any other person who in any manner assists in carrying on 
or conducting the business of an employer ” In addition, s 83A of the BCEA and s 200A of the LRA (as 
amended) make provision for a rebuttable presumption as to who is an employee as follows:
   “A person who works for, or renders services to, any other person is presumed, until the contrary is 
proved, to be an employee, regardless of the form of the contract, if any one or more of the following 
factors is present: the manner in which the person works is subject to the control or direction of another 
person; the person’s hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another person; in the case 
of a person who works for an organisation, the person is a part of that organisation; the person has 
worked for that other person for an average of at least 40 hours per month over the last three months; the 
person is economically dependent on the other person for whom that person works or renders services; 
the person is provided with tools of trade or work equipment by the other person; or the person only 
works for or renders services to one person ”
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a variety of vulnerable groups from the UIA’s scope of coverage. These 
excluded groups are largely comprised of certain categories of atypical 
workers (for example, independent contractors, dependent contractors, 
and the self-employed), informal economy workers and the long-term 
unemployed. South Africa could consider the following general measures 
for extending unemployment protection to these three vulnerable groups. 
As unemployment insurance by its very nature invariably provides benefits 
for a limited period of time to those who were or are working and who 
contributed to40 an unemployment insurance scheme and to their survivors, 
it would hardly be possible to cover the long-term unemployed through such 
a scheme – particularly in view of the numbers involved in a country such 
as South Africa. The long-term unemployed group should therefore not 
benefit from unemployment insurance, but could benefit from the possible 
introduction of a new (conditional) social grant.41 Therefore, this group will 
not be discussed any further here. However, attention should be given to 
the progressive extension of access to unemployment insurance to the self-
employed and those in the informal economy.42
The extension of coverage of statutory social insurance programmes to the 
self-employed raises a number of difficulties. These include the reluctance of 
the self-employed to pay both the employer’s and the worker’s contributions 
as well as a lack of understanding of the importance of social security and 
how the system works. To this could be added the difficulty in determining 
the level at which contributions should be made and to prevent the under-
declaration of income from the self-employed.43 In this regard, it is submitted 
that much can be learned from the Tunisian experience in extending social 
insurance coverage to the self-employed and informally employed.
3 2 2  The Tunisian experience
Using a variety of initiatives, Tunisia has succeeded in raising social 
security coverage – for health care, old age pensions, maternity and 
employment injury – from 60% to 84% of its workers and their families in 
just ten years. Nearly all Tunisians who work in the public and private non-
agricultural sectors are now covered. And, while coverage rates are still below 
50% in the agricultural sector and among the self-employed, the government 
hopes that all workers will be covered in the years to come. How has the 
 However, this presumption as well as “the resultant shift in the burden of proof to employers to rebut 
the presumption, has not been incorporated into the structures of the UIA” (Olivier & Van Kerken 
“Unemployment Insurance” in Social Security: A Legal Analysis 415 436)
40 Or in respect of whom contributions were paid
41 See the proposals contained in Department of Social Development Creating Our Future: Strategic 
Considerations for a Comprehensive System of Social Security (Discussion Paper) (2008) 19-20  These 
are discussed in more detail in part 2 of this series of articles
42 See Beattie “Social Protection for All: But How?” 2000 Int Lab Rev 129 139-142; Bailey “Extending the 
Range of Social Protection” in International Labour Organization (ILO) Reflections on Reform Strategies 
for Social Protection in English-Speaking African Countries (2000) 33 68-70; Van Langendock “The 
Social Protection of the Unemployed” 1997 International Social Security Review 29 34
43 ILO Extending Social Security and Fighting Poverty: Experiences from around the World (2002) 4 http://
www ilo org/public/english/protection/socsec/pol/campagne/files/countryexp pdf (accessed 11-10-2010)
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extension of coverage occurred so rapidly? In 1996, Tunisia implemented a 
social security system which combined proper enforcement with the creation 
of a more accurate income estimation system for the self-employed. These 
two aspects, combined with education programmes, have significantly raised 
the levels of coverage.44
In order to determine contribution levels, and to prevent under-reporting of 
income, income scales have been developed for various occupational groups, 
and these are used to calculate contributions. The scales determine the lowest 
income bracket relevant to the occupation of the insured person (physician, 
architect, shopkeeper, etc.) and the size of the firm or farm. Through the 
application of this scale, each insured person must contribute an amount equal 
to the bracket employed on the scale, unless they can prove that their real 
income is lower, while they are free to contribute on a higher scale. These 
changes to the social security system have had a positive impact on coverage 
extension.45
Although the extension of coverage to the informal economy in Tunisia 
has been less successful than the extension of social security coverage to the 
self-employed,46 it has nevertheless resulted in significant increases in the 
number of informal economy workers covered by social security schemes. 
This is particularly the case regarding schemes that provide income protection 
for old age, offer protection against illness, and compensation for industrial 
injury and occupational diseases.47
It is submitted that it is possible to apply the innovative approach of 
the Tunisian experience to other social security institutions, including 
unemployment insurance in South Africa. There is no reason why the 
employment of a realistic income scale cannot be implemented in South 
Africa. The existence of sectoral determinations and bargaining council 
agreements that set minimum wages in specific sectors could greatly assist 
in the determination of the occupation or industry specific income scales for 
purposes of determining contributions. The Tunisian experience illustrates the 
importance of the size of the contributory payments (it must be small enough 
to be affordable) as well as the importance of the flexibility of the payments (if 
it can be shown that the contributor is earning lower than the base income for 
the particular type of job then contributions will be paid on the lower scale). 
What the Tunisian example also demonstrates is that the different groups 
within the same sector should not be too small as this can restrict the scope 
and level of benefits available, as well as appearing unattractive for potential 
members.48
44 Olivier “Informality, Employment Contracts and Extension of Social Insurance Coverage” (2009) 
International Social Security Association Working Paper 9 54 http://www issa int/content/
download/91354/…/2-paper9-Olivier pdf (accessed 12-11-2010)
45 Olivier (2009) International Social Security Association Working Paper 54
46 For example, an adapted system was also unsuccessful at achieving high levels of coverage of fishermen  
There have also been lower levels of social security extension in rural areas due to the difficulties of 
administering the system in rural zones and fishing ports  Olivier (2009) International Social Security 
Association Working Paper 9 55
47 Olivier (2009) International Social Security Association Working Paper 9 55
48 56
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An alternative method to determine the income levels of the self-employed 
would be to link the contribution to the previous year’s income determined 
according to the income declared to the South African Revenue Service 
(should the self-employed person be registered as a taxpayer). Should the 
income during the current year be less than that declared to SARS during 
the previous financial year, the onus will be on the contributor concerned to 
verify the lower amount. This would require a direct link between the UIF and 
SARS, which would enable SARS to deduct the contribution automatically 
and pay it over to the UIF.
What is also of vital importance is that the extension of coverage to the 
self-employed should be accompanied by a strong education and consultation 
programme. Although certain quarters of the Tunisian workforce had been 
reluctant to fully embrace social security for a variety of reasons, the education 
programmes and societal changes in the perceptions towards social security 
meant that changes to the system were more readily embraced. This should 
take place alongside a consultative approach.
What the Tunisian example further illustrates is the complexity of extending 
coverage to the informal sector, suggesting that it is necessary to attempt 
implementing systems which are specific to the actual needs of the targeted 
group. In the South African context, it would require both the classification 
of certain sectors within the informal economy (for example, fishermen) and 
the registration of contributors within those sectors. Contributions would be 
based on similar principles to those of the self-employed, namely varying 
contributions per sector based on deemed income.
Finally, in situations where it would be difficult to determine what the 
income of the worker in the informal sector is in order to determine the 
value of the benefit, the possibility of creating a scheme in which equipment 
required for work would be replaced instead of income, should be considered. 
The inclusion of insurance for work equipment is an important feature as 
workers in the informal sector are dependent on their tools for their income, 
and struggle to afford replacement tools if theirs are stolen or damaged. An 
example of this type of scheme can be found in India. The Self-employed 
Women’s Association (SEWA) set up the Integrated Social Security Scheme 
which covers health care (with a small maternity care component), life 
insurance in the form of both death and invalidity and insurance against the 
loss or deterioration of work equipment or the home. Members pay an annual 
premium which is then passed on to a formal sector insurance company who 
take most of the risk. Members also have the option of making a once off 
payment into a SEWA bank account with the interest being used as the yearly 
insurance premium.49
49 57
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3 3  Employees employed for less than 24 hours per month
The UIA does not apply to employees employed for less than 24 hours 
per month under a particular employer, and their employers.50 The basis 
of this exclusion, it appears, is “to avoid cumbersome and cost-ineffective 
administration of contributions.”51 The disadvantage of this provision is that 
a person who works for various employers for short monthly periods, remains 
excluded even though he or she may be fully, or nearly fully, employed.52 It 
is therefore suggested that the restriction limiting coverage to those working 
more than 24 hours per month be lifted.
3 4  Learnerships
Employees under a contract of employment contemplated in section 18(2) 
of the Skills Development Act 97 of 1998 are not covered by the UIA and 
UICA.53 The exclusion of this group is retrogressive since they fell under 
the ambit of the previous Unemployment Insurance Act.54 Furthermore, this 
group is generally employed for a fixed-term duration of some length.55 While 
their exclusion is said to be justified on the basis of encouraging job creation,56 
it remains inconsistent with the inclusion generally of fixed-term employees 
within the framework of the South African unemployment insurance scheme.
The inclusion of learners would have the dual benefit of including a greater 
portion of the youth into the Fund at a very early stage of their working lives 
and contributing to the appeal of learnerships, thereby improving the role that 
learnerships can play in improving skills levels in the country.
It is therefore recommended that learners engaged under a contract of 
employment in terms of the Skills Development Act be included under the 
ambit of the UIA. Should the contract of employment be terminated at the 
expiry of the period of duration specified in the learnership agreement, the 
learner concerned should benefit from unemployment insurance like any 
other contributor under the UIA. If a learner was in the employment of the 
employer who was a party to the learnership agreement concerned when the 
agreement was concluded, the learner will merely continue to contribute to 
the UIF during the duration of the learnership agreement.57 If the learner is 
permanently employed by the employer with whom he or she concluded the 
learnership agreement, upon expiry of the learnership agreement he or she 
would merely continue contributing the Fund.
50 S 3(1) of the UIA
51 Olivier & Van Kerken “Unemployment Insurance” in Social Security: A Legal Analysis 443
52 443
53 S 3(1)(b) of the UIA; s 4(1)(b) of the UICA
54 See s 2 of the UIA
55 Olivier & Van Kerken “Unemployment Insurance” in Social Security: A Legal Analysis 438
56 According to the Minister of Labour: “As government we are encouraging employers to take on new 
learners hence we have not included them into the provision of the UIF” (Department of Labour 
“Pensioners and Employers taking on New Learners get UIF Exemption” (31-12-2003) Press Release)  
57 This is already provided for in the most recent Unemployment Insurance Bill  See Unemployment 
Insurance Amendment Bill (B 35-2003) in GG 25234 of 2003-06-22
452 STELL LR 2010 3
       
3 5  Public servants
Employees in the national and provincial spheres of government who are 
officers or employees58 and their employers are excluded from the UIA.59 
The exclusion of these employees is based on the assumption that the risk 
of unemployment for public servants is either low or non-existent.60 This 
assumption may be challenged, both legally and factually.61 The job security 
afforded to South African public servants is not as adequate as it is assumed 
to be. The risk of unemployment for private sector workers is often not greater 
than that of public servants in South Africa.62 In addition, it is doubtful if 
the exclusion of public servants from the UIF is constitutionally tenable.63 
58 As defined in s 1 (read with s 8) of the Public Service Act 103 of 1994  In terms of s 41 of the Public 
Service Amendment Act 30 of 2007 all references to “officer” in the Public Service Act were replaced 
with references to “employees”
59 S 3(1)(c) of the UIA (as amended)
60 See, for example, Olivier & Van Kerken “Unemployment Insurance” in Social Security: A Legal Analysis 
438
61 As Van Langendock 1997 International Social Security Review 33-34 puts it:
   “[The exclusion of public servants] seems reasonable enough, since those persons usually enjoy 
lifetime appointments, so that the risk of unemployment seems to be non-existent for them  It should 
be pointed out, however, that guarantees against dismissal also exist in the private sector for certain 
categories of workers  Why should the same not apply to the public sector? Moreover, a lifetime 
appointment is not a 100 per cent guarantee against loss of employment  In the public sector, one can 
still be dismissed, e g  for disciplinary reasons, following a prescribed procedure  This may be rare, but 
the persons concerned should certainly be protected against the loss of earnings and the loss of social 
protection which could result from it  And finally, public-sector workers should enjoy, in the same 
way as their fellows in the private sector, the right to leave their job if they have good reason to do so  
Nobody should be compelled to stay in the same occupation for life, not even in the public service  This 
right would be of a theoretical nature for all but those enjoying independent means of existence if, by 
leaving, people risked losing their income and their social protection for an indefinite period  For that 
matter, unemployment protection is necessary as a matter of principle, including in the public sector”
62 There is no significant difference between the employment protection afforded to public servants and 
other employees as both are largely subject to the same dismissal law contained in Chapter VIII of the 
LRA (Olivier & Van Kerken “Unemployment Insurance” in Social Security: A Legal Analysis 438)  It 
could be argued that, at least in the past, public servants enjoyed the protection of administrative law  
However, in two recent Constitutional Court judgments it was held that this protection is, generally 
speaking, no longer available to public servants, in view of their coverage in terms of the LRA: see 
generally Chirwa v Transnet Limited 2007 ZACC 23; 2008 2 BLLR 97 (CC); Gcaba v Minister of Safety 
and Security 2009 ZACC 26; 2009 ILJ 2623 (CC)  Furthermore, the administrative law protection which 
was available to public servants does not contribute much to their protection since it is primarily focused 
on principles of natural justice and validity (Olivier & Van Kerken “Unemployment Insurance” in Social 
Security: A Legal Analysis 438)
63 As Olivier & Van Kerken “Unemployment Insurance” in Social Security: A Legal Analysis 439-440 point 
out:
   “There are, constitutionally speaking, several fundamental rights which come into play when the 
exclusion of public servants from the UIF is considered – for example, the right to fair labour practices, 
the right to equality, and the right to have access to social security  The Constitutional Court already 
made it clear [in SA National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 20 ILJ 2265 (CC)] that the 
exclusion of (a particular category of) public servants from a specific law would still entitle them to 
challenge the statutory restrictions constitutionally, on the basis that a fundamental right has allegedly 
been infringed  The implication is that the limitation of any of the fundamental rights referred to above 
must satisfy the limitation criteria contained in s 36 of the Constitution  In terms of this the limitation 
must be contained in a law of general application; the limitation must also be reasonable and justifiable 
in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom  One of the issues 
that a court must consider in this regard, is the question whether a legitimate (governmental) purpose 
of sufficient importance is being served by the limitation  The argument that by not including/covering 
public servants the state will be able to do more in terms of social security for the poor, does not, in 
itself, constitute a legitimate government purpose of sufficient importance  Such an approach mixes 
and confuses the role of the state as employer and its role as provider of social security for the indigent  
It also creates all sorts of unnecessary imbalances”
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Furthermore, there are unemployment protection instruments (such as the 
Employment Promotion and Protection against Unemployment Convention of 
the ILO)64 which permit the exclusion of public servants from the ambit of the 
unemployment insurance scheme. However, the exclusion of public servants is 
permitted (for example, by the aforesaid instrument) only in a situation where 
these employees have their employment guaranteed up to normal retirement.65 
Several mechanisms for extending unemployment insurance coverage to 
public servants exist. South Africa could, for example, consider incorporating 
public servants into the current unemployment insurance scheme, allowing 
public servants to contribute on their own (even though this may be subject 
to constitutional challenge), or making an arrangement (like in Belgium) 
whereby civil servants contribute 1% of their salaries to the UIF while the 
state compensates the Fund for benefits paid out.66
Including public servants in the beneficiary population without contributing 
would not be sustainable. The benefits would quickly outgrow contributions. 
The suggestion of providing the contribution a claimant would have made only 
when claimed would not improve sustainability. This is because the remainder 
of the public servants not claiming would not have contributed and therefore 
the element of pooling risks does not apply. However, it is acknowledged that 
the State may feel unable on fiscal grounds to contribute to the scheme at the 
same rate as private employers. Finally, a scenario in which only the public 
servant contributes to the Fund would naturally reduce both the contribution 
rate as well as the benefit rate.
It is therefore recommended that the coverage of public servants by the UIA 
be prioritised on the basis of an equal employer and employee contribution. 
Their inclusion, as the Department of Social Development noted in a recent 
report “is a matter of national solidarity”.67 The Consolidated Report of the 
Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for 
South Africa recommended that government workers (at least) be allowed the 
option, via their representative organisations, of whether or not to become 
contributors to the UIF.68 On this basis, public servants who contribute to the 
Fund could receive restricted benefits limited to their own contributions.
3 6  Partial unemployment
Contrary to the preceding Act, the UIA provides for benefits only in the 
case of full unemployment (except in the case of domestic workers). The 
current UIA therefore abandoned the position whereby a contributor who 
was employed by two employers simultaneously and lost one employment 
64 ILO Employment Promotion and Protection against Unemployment Convention 168 of 1988
65 This international law framework is crucial in the light of s 39(1)(b) of the Constitution which directs 
courts, tribunals and other forums to consider international law when interpreting fundamental rights 
contained in the Constitution
66 Olivier & Van Kerken “Unemployment Insurance” in Social Security: A Legal Analysis 441
67 Department of Social Development Creating Our Future 50
68 Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa Consolidated 
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa 
“Transforming the Present – Protecting the Future” (2002) 72
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while he/she retained the other, was allowed to claim unemployment benefits 
for the lost job.69 It also abandoned the position according to which an 
unemployed contributor, who accepted employment at less than 50% of his 
average weekly rate of earnings which he received during the three months 
immediately preceding his unemployment, was entitled to receive a special 
weekly allowance for a maximum period of thirteen weeks. This enabled an 
unemployed person to retain whatever integration he or she had in the labour 
market, and enabled him or her to proceed to full integration from there. In 
providing for benefits only for full unemployment the current legislation loses 
sight of the policy consideration that a person who is allowed to retain benefits 
while starting some (part-time) employment will, hopefully, gradually again 
become independent of the Fund. It is also contrary to ILO Convention 168 of 
1988 on Employment Promotion and Protection against Unemployment which 
specifically requires the provision of benefits in circumstances of partial 
unemployment70 and the Employment Guidelines adopted by the European 
Union, all of which are aimed at re-integrating the unemployed into the labour 
market.71
This exclusion also has a disproportionate impact on women. In South 
Africa, as appears to be the general position world-wide, women are heavily 
represented in part-time, low-income, intermittent and precarious jobs, which 
often fall outside the coverage of social security.72 Moreover, most women 
often assume the greater part of parental responsibility and therefore have 
less time to build up their social security entitlements.73 In light of the dicta 
in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom,74 the state has 
an obligation to formulate policies and legislative measures – also in the area 
of unemployment protection – that take into account the vulnerable position 
women hold in society regarding employment.
It is therefore recommended that the UIA should make those contributors 
who become partially unemployed eligible for benefits. The basis for 
calculating the benefit payable should be the same as for domestic servants, 
namely, that a contributor who is employed by more than one employer and 
whose employment is terminated by one or more employers is, despite still 
being employed, entitled to benefits in terms of this Act if the contributor’s total 
income falls below the benefit level that the contributor would have received if 
he or she had become wholly unemployed.75 In addition, it should reintroduce 
a provision that would allow a person who accepted employment at less than 
50% of his or her average weekly rate of earnings which he or she received 
during the three months immediately preceding his unemployment to receive 
a special weekly allowance for a maximum period of thirteen weeks. This 
69 See Olivier & Van Kerken “Unemployment Insurance” in Social Security: A Legal Analysis 448-449  
70 See, amongst others, arts 2 and 10 of the ILO Employment Promotion and Protection against 
Unemployment Convention
71 Olivier & Van Kerken “Unemployment Insurance” in Social Security: A Legal Analysis 448
72 ILO World Labour Report 2000: Income security and social protection in a changing world (2000) http://
www ilo org/public/english/protection/socsec/wlrblurb htm 15 (accessed 10-10-2010)
73 ILO World Labour Report 2000 15
74 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (C) 44
75 See s 12(1A) of the UIA
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would improve the ability of the UIA to prevent and combat unemployment, 
and to reintegrate those who have become unemployed in the labour market.
3 7  Migrant workers
Excluded from the scope of the UIA and UICA are persons who enter South 
Africa for the purpose of carrying out a contract of service, apprenticeship or 
learnership within the Republic if upon the termination thereof the employer 
is required by law or by contract of service, apprenticeship or learnership, as 
the case may be, or by any other agreement or undertaking, to repatriate that 
person, or that person is so required to leave South Africa.76 The exclusion of 
this group of persons as found in the present UIA can be traced to the previous 
UIA.
The exclusion of this category of workers raises problems of both a 
constitutional and international law nature. The UIA treatment of different 
categories of fixed-term contract workers is inconsistent. On the one hand, 
fixed-term contract workers are covered under the unemployment insurance 
scheme.77 On the other hand, non-citizen fixed-term contract workers, who 
are required to return to their home countries at the end of their contracts 
of employment, are excluded from the ambit of the UIA. This differential 
treatment of non-citizens could be challenged as discriminatory on the basis 
of nationality.78
It is arguable that the exclusion of non-citizen fixed-term contract workers 
could be in breach of certain ILO Conventions.79 The ILO Conventions 
require member states to treat lawfully residing non-citizens on the same basis 
as citizens in social security matters, including unemployment insurance.80 
More specifically, South Africa has ratified the Unemployment Convention.81 
This Convention requires South Africa to make arrangements with other 
ratifying countries to ensure that non-citizens from such countries who are 
employed in South Africa are eligible for the same rate of (unemployment 
76 S 3(1)(d) of the UIA  As Olivier & Guthrie Extending Employment Injury and Disease Protection to 
the Non-formal Sector and Non-citizen Workers: The Quest for Innovative Approaches unpublished 
paper presented at the 7th International Conference on Work Injuries Prevention, Rehabilitation and 
Compensation in Hong Kong, 29-06-2006 (copy on file with the authors) point out, it should be kept in 
mind that:
   “national laws, and often also international instruments, invariably differentiate between permanent 
residents, temporary residents, migrant workers, refugees, asylum-seekers and illegal non-citizens  
The interplay between immigration, termination of service and social security laws is crucial to the 
understanding of the status of non-citizen workers…The overall conclusion to be drawn is that the 
stronger the immigration status, the better the access to social security”  
77 S 16(1)(a)(i) of the UIA
78 See Olivier, Khoza, Jansen van Rensburg & Klinck “Constitutional Issues” in Olivier, Smit & Kalula 
(eds) Social Security: A Legal Analysis (2003) 49 98-99  Also see, generally, Larbi-Odam v Member of 
the Executive Council for Education (North West Province) 1997 12 BCLR 1655 (CC)  
79 Olivier & Van Kerken “Unemployment Insurance” in Social Security: A Legal Analysis 442; Mpedi 
Resigning the South African Unemployment Protection System: A Socio-legal Inquiry LLD thesis UJ 
(2006) 84
80 See, for example, ILO Migration for Employment (Revised) Convention 97 of 1949; ILO Equality of 
Treatment (Social Security) Convention 118 of 1962
81 ILO Unemployment Convention 2 of 1919
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insurance) benefit as that available to local workers.82 The absence of such 
arrangements in South Africa means that South Africa is in violation of its 
international obligations in this regard.83
In order to ensure consistency and that South Africa is in compliance with 
its obligations under the relevant ILO Convention, provision should be made 
for the inclusion under the ambit of the UIA of migrant workers on fixed-term 
contracts who are required to return to their home countries at the end of their 
contracts of employment.
This of course raises a number of difficulties of a practical nature. Should 
migrant workers on fixed-term contracts be included under the ambit of the 
UIA, their contributions will have to be paid out while they are either in 
their countries of origin or in another country. In addition, verification of the 
continued unemployment of the migrant worker will have to be monitored. 
However, some precedent for the payment of social security benefits to 
beneficiaries who are outside South Africa already exists. Section 16 of the 
Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 read with Regulation 31 makes provision for 
the payment of a social grant to a beneficiary who will be absent from South 
Africa for a period not exceeding 90 days under certain circumstances.84 
Should such circumstances exist and payment be made, the beneficiary has 
to regularly report to a mission abroad or to any other designated office for 
purposes of identification and verification.85 This model could be adapted 
to cover the situation of the payment of unemployment insurance to migrant 
workers.
It is therefore recommended that migrant workers on fixed-term contracts 
who have to leave South Africa upon the expiry of their contracts be allowed 
to contribute to the UIF. This would ensure consistent treatment of all fixed-
term employees under the UIA. In the absence of a bilateral agreement which 
arranges for verification by authorities of the relevant country, a specific form 
should be developed for completion by the beneficiary that would verify his 
or her identity and his or her continued unemployment. The form must be 
certified by a commissioner of oaths in the country concerned and submitted 
to the relevant South African mission or other office designated for that 
purpose. Such information must be communicated to the UIF by the mission 
or office concerned.
82 Art 3 of the Unemployment Convention, 1919 provides as follows:
   “The Members of the International Labour Organisation which ratify this Convention and which have 
established systems of insurance against unemployment shall, upon terms being agreed between the 
Members concerned, make arrangements whereby workers belonging to one Member and working in 
the territory of another shall be admitted to the same rates of benefit of such insurance as those which 
obtain for the workers belonging to the latter”
83 Olivier & Van Kerken “Unemployment Insurance” in Social Security: A Legal Analysis 442
84 Where the beneficiary is outside the Republic to receive medical attention, or is unfit to travel back to 
South Africa, or where for reasons beyond the control of the beneficiary he or she is unable to return to 
South Africa  See Regulation 31(1)(a)-(c) of the Social Assistance Act
85 Regulation 31(2)
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3 8  Irregular migrants
Apart from some exceptions for foreigners with permanent residence status 
or who have attained South African citizenship on a dual citizenship basis, 
non-nationals are generally excluded from social security protection in South 
Africa.86 In general, irregular migrants are excluded from social insurance 
schemes in South Africa. This includes both unemployment insurance as well 
as workers compensation. The reason is that a person who is not in possession 
of a work permit as required by section 19 of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 
is not an employee for labour law and, one could add, social security law 
purposes (for purpose of bringing a case before the labour law adjudicating 
institutions),87 as no valid contract of employment exists and such a person 
cannot be understood to be “an employee”. Both the Unemployment Insurance 
Act 63 of 2001 as well as the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and 
Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (COIDA) extends benefits only to those who qualify 
as “employees”.88
However, in light of the recent Labour Court decision in Discovery Health 
Limited v CCMA89 (“Discovery Health”), this unqualified position is no longer 
tenable. In Discovery Health, the court extended labour rights to a foreign 
national whose work permit had expired. The court noted that, although the 
Immigration Act 13 of 2002 prohibits the employment of foreign workers 
without work permits, the only consequence of doing so is that the employer is 
guilty of a criminal offence. This position rejects a line of decisions that held 
that a contract is void even if only one party is subject to a criminal penalty.90 
What are the implications of this judgment as far as unemployment insurance 
is concerned?
In general, there seems to be some differentiation between schemes funded 
entirely from employer contributions where employers are under an obligation 
to make such contributions even if they employ irregular migrant workers (in 
particular schemes covering occupational injuries and diseases) and schemes 
where the contributions are drawn from both the employer and employee, and 
where the benefits are explicitly linked with lawfully performed work (such 
as unemployment insurance schemes).91 In the case of the former, workers 
(irrespective of their status) should be entitled to the benefits. In the case of 
the latter, international and regional instruments support at least a limited 
86 For example, non-citizens with permanent resident status are entitled to workers compensation in the 
event of an accident or disease (see the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 
1993)  In terms of the UIA, they will be entitled to benefits, if they are retrenched, become ill or pregnant, 
or adopt young children
87 See generally Moses v Safika Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2001 22 ILJ 1261 (CCMA); Vundla v Millies Fashions 
2003 24 ILJ 462 (CCMA); Lende v Goldberg 1983 2 SA 284 (C); Georgieva-Deyanova v Craighall 
Spar 2004 9 BALR 1143 (CCMA); Maila v Pieterse 2003 12 BALR 1405 (CCMA)  Also see, however, 
Mackenzie v Paparazzi Pizzeria Restaurant obo Pretorius 1998 BALR 1165 (CCMA)
88 Or a similar term used, such as “contributor”: see s 2(1) of the Unemployment Insurance Act 30 of 1966 
and the similarly worded provision in the Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001  See also s 1 of the 
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1994
89 2008 7 BLLR 633 (LC)
90 See, for instance, Standard Bank v Estate Van Rhyn 1925 AD 266; Lende v Goldberg 1983 4 ILJ 271 (C)
91 See Cholewinski Study on Obstacles to Effective Access of Irregular Migrants to Minimum Social Rights 
(2005) 42
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entitlement.92 In practice, this amounts to the return of the contributions that 
the irregular migrant may have made. The import of these international and 
regional guidelines is that irregular migrants who have made contributions 
to unemployment insurance in South Africa should at least be entitled to the 
return of their contributions.93 While there are certainly legitimate reasons 
for differentiating between irregular migrants and those in a regular situation, 
and for extending fewer benefits to the former, it will be difficult, in light 
of the international and regional instruments referred to above, to justify 
depriving irregular migrants of the contributions they have actually made 
while employed. While this would have no cost implications for the Fund, it 
would bring South Africa in line with international instruments.
It is therefore recommended that irregular migrants who have made 
contributions to the UIF during their period of regular employment, or who 
made contributions while not being entitled to do so due to the irregularity 
of their situation, should at least be entitled to the return of their (but not 
their employers’) contributions. This is in line with international and regional 
instruments, including ILO Convention No 143 and ILO Recommendation 
151.
4  Concluding remarks and recommendations
The UIA and UICA are applicable to all employers and employees except 
for those specifically excluded. The UIA scope of coverage is narrow as it 
continues to exclude the atypically employed (particularly independent 
contractors, so-called dependent contractors and those who are self-employed 
or informally employed), public servants in the national and provincial spheres 
of government, learners, and certain categories of migrant workers from its 
purview. Given the vulnerable position of these groups, it is arguable that 
South Africa should, as a matter of principle, broaden the scope of coverage 
to include them. Furthermore, these exclusions may be susceptible to 
constitutional challenge in the context of the right to access to social security.
92 This view corresponds with the position adopted by the Council of Europe and one which they invite all 
their member states to implement, Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population “Human Rights 
of Irregular Migrants” Council of Europe No 10924 (04-03-2006) www http://assembly coe int/Main
asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc06/EDOC10924 htm para 70 (accessed 11-10-2010)  Support 
for this can also be found in Article 27(2) of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights 
of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990) (adopted by General Assembly resolution 
45/158 of 18 December 1990)  Even though the provision in the latter instrument is weakly worded on the 
whole, it appears that the intention was to extend some social security protection to irregular migrants, at 
least those benefits to which they have contributed  Article 9(1) of the ILO Convention No 143 Migrant 
Workers (Supplementary Provisions), 1975 protects the social security rights of migrant workers arising 
out of “past employment”  It appears that the wording “past employment” refers to past periods of legal 
as well as illegal employment  Finally in this regard, ILO Migrant Workers Recommendation 151 of 1975 
stipulates in para 34(1)(c)(ii) that all migrant workers who leave the country of employment should be 
entitled to “reimbursement of any social security contributions which have not given and will not give rise 
to rights under national laws or regulations or international arrangements”
93 A recent bilateral agreement between the United States and Mexico has even gone one step further  In 
order to facilitate claims by irregular Mexican migrants in the wake of the conclusion of the agreement, 
the US Congress passed legislation which granted anyone who had made contributions to the US Social 
Security Administration prior to 2004 a legal entitlement to benefits associated with these contributions, 
independent of residence status and work permit status
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In this article, the importance of extending coverage to currently excluded 
groups is highlighted. While the importance of including all the currently 
excluded groups cannot be denied, it is acknowledged that it will not be 
financially feasible to include all the groups at once. In prioritising the 
groups most urgently in need of inclusion, two important factors are taken 
into consideration. The first factor is of a legal nature, while the second is 
a financial one. In the first place, the exclusion of certain groups may be 
vulnerable to constitutional challenge. The exclusion of, in particular, public 
servants and migrant workers fall into this category. This article proceeds 
from the standpoint that priority should be given to the inclusion of those 
currently excluded from the UIA where the exclusion raises concerns of a 
constitutional nature. Second, including some groups may possibly have 
no or negligible financial impact on the financial viability of the Fund, and 
their inclusion should therefore be supported. In this regard, the return of 
contributions to undocumented migrants, the inclusion of learners and the 
inclusion of the partially unemployed come to mind. However, this article also 
recognises that some of the recommendations made may have a noticeable 
impact on the solvency levels of the Fund, and that it may not be possible 
to accommodate all of them immediately. This relates in particular to the 
introduction of unemployment benefits to employees who resign to take care 
of children or to care for a terminally ill family member (the so-called “carer’s 
benefit”).
Against this background, the following recommendations are made to 
broaden the scope of coverage of the UIF (in order of priority):
• Recommendation 1: It is recommended that the coverage of public servants 
by the UIA be prioritised, on the basis of an equal employer and employee 
contribution. Their continued exclusion raises serious constitutional 
concerns. Their inclusion is also a matter of national solidarity.
• Recommendation 2: Migrant workers on fixed-term contracts who have 
to leave South Africa upon the expiry of their contracts should be allowed 
to contribute to the UIF. This would ensure consistent treatment of all 
fixed-term employees under the UIA and bring South Africa in line with 
its obligations under ILO Convention 2 of 1919. In the absence of a bilateral 
agreement which arranges for verification by authorities of the relevant 
country, specific verification modalities as indicated in this article should 
be developed.
• Recommendation 3: Learners engaged under a contract of employment in 
terms of the Skills Development Act should be included under the ambit 
of the UIA. Should the contract of employment be terminated at the 
expiry of the period of duration specified in the learnership agreement, 
the learner concerned should benefit from unemployment insurance like 
any other contributor under the UIA. If a learner was in the employment 
of the employer party to the learnership agreement concerned when the 
agreement was concluded, the learner will merely continue to contribute 
to the UIF during the duration of the learnership agreement (this is already 
provided for in the most recent Unemployment Insurance Bill). If the learner 
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is permanently employed by the employer with whom he or she concluded 
the learnership agreement upon expiry of the learnership agreement, he or 
she would merely continue contributing the Fund.
• Recommendation 4: Irregular migrants who have made contributions to the 
UIF during their period of regular employment, or who made contributions 
while not being entitled to do so due to the irregularity of their situation, 
should at least be entitled to the return of their (but not their employers’) 
contributions. This is in line with international and regional instruments, 
including ILO Convention No 143 and ILO Recommendation 151, and 
international best practice.
• Recommendation 5: The UIA should make those contributors who become 
partially unemployed eligible for benefits. The basis for calculating the 
benefit payable should be the same as for domestic workers, namely, that 
a contributor who is employed by more than one employer and whose 
employment is terminated by one or more employers is, despite still being 
employed, entitled to benefits in terms of the Act if the contributor’s 
total income falls below the benefit level that the contributor would have 
received if he or she had become wholly unemployed.94 In addition, it 
should reintroduce a provision that would allow a person who accepted 
employment at less than 50% of his or her average weekly rate of earnings 
which he or she received during the three months immediately preceding 
his unemployment to receive a special weekly allowance for a maximum 
period of thirteen weeks. This would improve the ability of the UIA to 
prevent and combat unemployment, and to reintegrate those who have 
become unemployed in the labour market.
• Recommendation 6: The restriction limiting coverage to those working 
more than 24 hours per month should be removed from the UIA.
• Recommendation 7: In keeping with some international practice, the 
UIF should consider alternative arrangements for inclusion of the self-
employed and for those working in the informal economy. This could 
take the form of the development of one or more special schemes or 
the accommodation of these categories within branches of the existing 
scheme. Such coverage extension may have to be gradual, beginning with 
pilot projects in specific sectors already subject to regulation in the form 
of either sectoral determinations or bargaining council agreements. It is 
suggested that participation initially be voluntary. This could be extended 
over the medium- to long-term. As an important first step, the possibility of 
ensuring the retention of benefits by employees who become self-employed 
or move into informal work should be considered.
• Recommendation 8: Finally, the UIA should be amended to allow benefits 
to be paid to contributors who resign or suspend their employment for a 
“compelling family reason”. “Compelling family reasons” include both the 
care of children (natural or adopted) and that of a terminally ill family 
member. Consideration could be given to extend this exception to also 
94 See s 12(1A) of the UIA
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cover employees who resign to undergo further education and training and 
to employees who resign in order to become self-employed.
Extending coverage to the above categories of persons would serve a fourfold 
purpose. In the first place, it will ensure that the coverage provisions of South 
Africa’s unemployment insurance laws are aligned to constitutional prescripts 
and international standards. Secondly, it will address inconsistencies created 
and coverage gaps left by the retrogressive provisions of the unemployment 
insurance legislation of 2001. In the third instance, it will extend coverage to 
workers in the informal economy whose position is for all intents and purposes 
precarious. Finally, it will make the unemployment insurance responsive to 
the need to extend coverage on the basis of important humanitarian grounds.
SUMMARY
The scope of the Unemployment Insurance Act (UIA) is narrow as it continues to exclude the 
atypically employed (particularly independent contractors, so-called dependent contractors and those 
who are self-employed or informally employed), public servants, learners, and certain categories of 
migrant workers from its purview. Given the vulnerable position of these groups, it is arguable that 
South Africa should, as a matter of principle, broaden the scope of coverage to include them. While the 
importance of including all the currently excluded groups cannot be denied, it is acknowledged that 
it will not be financially feasible to include all of the groups at once. In prioritising the groups most 
urgently in need of inclusion, two important factors are taken into consideration. Firstly, the exclusion 
of certain groups may be vulnerable to constitutional challenge. The exclusion of, in particular, public 
servants and migrant workers fall into this category. This article proceeds from the standpoint that 
priority should be given to the inclusion of those currently excluded from the UIA where the exclusion 
raises concerns of a constitutional nature. Secondly, including some groups may possibly have no or 
negligible financial impact on the financial viability of the Fund, and their inclusion should therefore 
be supported. In this regard, the return of contributions to undocumented migrants, the inclusion 
of learners and the inclusion of the partially unemployed come to mind. However, this article also 
recognises that some of the recommendations made may have a significant impact on the solvency 
levels of the Fund, and that it may not be possible to accommodate all of them immediately. This 
relates in particular to the introduction of unemployment benefits to employees who resign to take care 
of children or to care for a terminally ill family member (the so-called “carer’s benefit”).
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